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Countable Additivity, Idealisation,
and Conceptual Realism
YANG LIU
University of Cambridge
This paper addresses the issue of finite versus countable additivity in Bayesian probabil-
ity and decision Theory – in particular, Savage’s theory of subjective expected utility and
personal probability. I show that Savage’s reason for not requiring countable additivity in
his theory is inconclusive. The assessment leads to an analysis of various highly idealised
assumptions commonly adopted in Bayesian theory, where I argue that a healthy dose of,
what I call, conceptual realism is often helpful in understanding the interpretational value
of sophisticated mathematical structures employed in applied sciences like decision theory.
In the last part, I introduce countable additivity into Savage’s theory and explore some tech-
nical properties in relation to other axioms of the system.
1. Introduction
One recurring topic in philosophy of probability concerns the additivity condition of
probability measures as to whether a numerical probability function should be finitely
or countably additive (henceforth FA and CA respectively for short1). The issue is partic-
ularly controversial within Bayesian subjective decision and probability theory, where
probabilities are seen as measures of agents’ degrees of beliefs, which are interpreted
within a general framework of rational decision making. As one of the founders of
Bayesian subjectivist theory, de Finetti famously rejected CA because (as I will explain
below) he takes that CA is in tension with the subjectivist interpretation of probability.
De Finett’s view, however, was contested among philosophers.
The debate on FA versus CA in Bayesian models often operates on two fronts. First,
there is the concern of mathematical consequences as a result of assuming either FA
or CA. Proponents of CA often refer to a pragmatic (or even a sociological) point that
it is a common practice in mathematics that probability measures are taken to be CA
ever since the first axiomatisation of probability theory by Kolmogorov. Among the
advantages of assuming CA is that it allows the subjective interpretation of probability
to keep stepwith the standard andwell-establishedmathematical theory of probability.
However, alternative ways of establishing a rich theory of probability based on FA are
1. In what follows ‘FA’ will be used ambiguously for both ‘finitely additive’ and ‘finite additivity,’
similarly for ‘CA’. The use of singular ‘they’ will also be adopted where appropriate.
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also possible.2 Hence differentmathematical reasons are cited by both sides of the debate
as bearing evidence either for or against the choice of FA or CA.
The second general concern is about the conceptual underpinning of different ad-
ditivity conditions under the subjective interpretation of probability. As noted above,
within the subjectivist framework, a theory of personal probability is embeddedwithin
a general theory of rational decisionmaking, couched in terms of how agents’ probabil-
istic beliefs coherently guide their actions. Such normative theories of actions are often
based on a series of rationality postulates governing an agent’s partial beliefs as well
as their choice behaviours in decision situations. This then gives rise to the question as
to how the choice of FA or CA – an otherwise unremarkable mathematical property of
some additive function – is accounted for within the subjectivist theory. There is thus
the problem of explaining why (and what) rules for rational beliefs and actions should
always respect one additivity condition rather than the other.
Much has been written about de Finetti’s reasons for rejecting CA on both fronts.
I will refer to some of these arguments and related literature below. My focus here,
however, is on the issue of additivity condition within Savage’s theory of subjective
expected utility (Savage, 1954, 1972). The latter is widely seen as the paradigmatic sys-
tem of subjective decision making, on which a classical theory of personal probability
is based. Following de Finetti, Savage also cast out CA for probability measures de-
rived in his system. One goal of this paper is to point out that the arguments enlisted
by Savage were inconclusive. Accordingly, I want to explore ways of introducing CA
into Savage’s system, which I will pursue in the last part of this paper.
As we shall see, the discussion will touch upon various highly idealised assump-
tions on certain underlying logical and mathematical structures that are commonly
adopted in Bayesian probability and decision theory. The broader philosophical aim
of this paper is thus to provide an analysis of these assumptions, where I argue that a
healthy dose of, what I call, conceptual realism is often helpful in understanding the in-
terpretational values of certain sophisticatedmathematics involved in applied sciences
like Bayesian decision theory.
1.1. The measure problem
To begin, in a section titled “Some mathematical details” Savage (1972) explained his
take on additivity conditions in his subjectivist theory, he says,
It is not usual to suppose, as has been done here, that all sets have a nu-
merical probability, but rather a sufficiently rich class of sets do so, the re-
mainder being considered unmeasurable . . . the theory being developed
here does assume that probability is defined for all events, that is, for all
sets of states, and it does not imply countable additivity, but only finite
additivity . . . it is a little better not to assume countable additivity as a
postulate, but rather as a special hypothesis in certain contexts. (p. 40,
emphasis added)
2. Rao and Rao (1983), for instance, is a study of probability calculus based on FA.
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One main mathematical reason provided by Savage for not requiring CA is that there
does not exist, it is said, a countably additive extension of the Lebesgue measure defin-
able over all subsets of the unit interval (or the real line), whereas in the case of finitely
additive measures, such an extension does exist. Since events are taken to be “all sets
of states” in his system (all subsets of the reals, P(R), in the case where the state space
is the real line), CA is ruled out because of this claimed defect.
Savage’s remarks refer to the basic problem of measure theory posed by Henri
Lebesgue at the turn of the twentieth century known as the problem of measurability.3
Lebesgue himself developed a measure towards the solution to this problem. Unlike
other attempts made around the same period (Bingham, 2000), the measure developed
by him, later known as the Lebesgue measure, was constructed in accordance with cer-
tain algebraic structure of sets of the reals. As seen, the measure problem would be
solved if it could be shown that the Lebesgue measure satisfies all the measurability
conditions (i.e., conditions (a)-(d) in Footnote 3).
Themeasure problem, however, was soon answered in the negative by Vitali (1905),
who showed that, in the presence of the Axiom of Choice (AC), there exist sets of real
numbers that are not (Lebesgue) measurable. This means that, with AC, Lebesgue’s
measure is definable only for a proper class of all subsets of the reals, the remainder be-
ing unmeasurable. Then a natural question to ask is whether there exists an ‘extension’
of Lebesgue measure such that it not only agrees with Lebesgue measure on all meas-
urable sets, but is also definable for non-measurable ones. Call this the revised measure
problem. This revised problem gives rise to a more general question as to whether or
not there exists a real-valued measure on any infinite set.
To anticipate our discussion on subjective probabilities and Savage’s reasons for
relaxing the CA condition, let us reformulate the question in terms of probabilistic
measures defined over some infinite set. Let S be a (countably or uncountably) infinite
set, a measure on S is a non-negative real-valued function µ on P(S) such that
(i) µ is defined for all subsets of S;
(ii) µ(∅) = 0, µ(S) = 1;
(iii) µ is countably additive (or σ-additive), that is, if {Xn}∞n=1 is a collection of pair-
wisely disjoint bounded subsets of R, then
µ
(
∞⋃
n=1
Xn
)
=
∞
∑
n=1
µ
(
Xn
)
. (1.1)
3. More precisely, in his 1902 thesis Lebesgue raised the following question about the real line:
Does there exist a measure m such that (a) m associates with each bounded subset X of R a real
number m(X); (b) m is non-trivial, i.e., m(X) ̸= 0 for all X ̸= ∅; (c) m is translation-invariant, that
is, for any X ⊆ R and any r ∈ R, define X + r := {x + r | x ∈ X}, then m(X) = m(X + r); and
(d) m is σ-additive, that is, if {Xn}∞n=1 is a collection of pairwise disjoint bounded subsets of R, then
m
(⋃
n Xn
)
= ∑n m
(
Xn
)
? See Hawkins (1975) for a detailed account of the historical development of
Lebesgue’s theory of measure and integration.
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1.2. Issues arising
Let us distinguish two cases depending on the cardinality of S: If S contains only
countably many elements (e.g., S = N), then it is interesting to note that µ cannot
be both CA and uniformly distributed (or, for that matter, µ cannot be a measure that
assigns 0 to all singletons). Indeed, let {s1, s2, . . .} be an enumeration of all the elements
in S. Suppose that µ is uniformly distributed on S and is real-valued, then it must be
that µ(si) = 0 for all i ∈ N. But, by CA, 1 = µ(S) = µ
(⋃∞
i=1{si}
)
= ∑∞i=1 µ(si) = 0,
which is absurd. Hence there does not exist a CA uniform distribution on a countable
set. It turns out that this simple mathematical fact became one of the main reasons that
led de Finetti to reject CA. We shall revisit this line of argument in the context Savage’s
subjectivist theory in Section 2.
If, on the other hand, S contains uncountably many elements (e.g., S = R), it is
known that an extension of Lebesgue measure exists if and only if there exists a meas-
ure on the continuum (or any S with |S| = 2ℵ0) satisfying conditions (i)-(iii). Hence,
the revised measure problemwould be solved if the latter question could be answered.
By referring to a result of Ulam (1930) (cf. Footnote 13 below), Savage gave a definitive
answer in saying that such an extension does not exist. This conclusion is inaccurate.
In fact, there is no straightforward answer to this question: the existence of a CA meas-
ure on P(S) that extends Lebesgue measure depends on the background set-theoretic
axioms one presupposes. The issue is closely related to the theory of large cardinals,
we shall return to this with more details in Section 3.
All in all, these claims of the non-existence of CA measures on P(S) for both the
countable and the uncountable cases lead to the suggestion of weakening the additivity
condition (iii) and replacing it with the following condition.
(iii*) µ is finitely additive, that is, for any X,Y ⊆ S, if X ∩Y = ∅ then
µ(X ∪Y) = µ(X) + µ(Y). (1.2)
It is plain that (iii) implies (iii*) but not vice versa, hence this condition amounts to
placing a weaker constraint on the additivity condition for probability measures. Fur-
ther, it turns out, with all other mathematical conditions being equal,4 there does exist FA
probability measures definable on P(S) for both the countable and the uncountable
cases. These claimed advantages of FA over CA eventually led Savage to opt for FA.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I review issues concerning
uniformly distributed measures within Savage’s theory. I observe that it is ill-placed to
consider such measures in Savage’s system given his own view on uniform partitions.
In Section 3, I provide a critical assessment of Savage’s set-theoretic arguments in fa-
vour of FA, where I defend an account of conceptual realism regarding mathematical
practices in applied sciences like decision theory. In Section 4, I explore some technical
properties of CA in Savage’s system. Section 5 concludes.
4. This quantifier is important because, as we shall see, whether FA or CA forms a consistent
theory depends on other background conditions. Extra mathematical principles are often involved
in selecting these conditions when they are in conflict. The discussion on conceptual realism below
is an attempt to strike a balance between various mathematical and conceptual considerations.
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2. Uniform Distributions
De Finetti (1937b) proposed an operationalist account of subjective probability – i.e.,
the well-known “betting interpretation” of probability – and showed that a rational
decision maker affords the possibility of avoiding exposure to a sure loss if and only
if the set of betting quotients with which they handle their bets satisfies conditions (i),
(ii), and (iii*) above.
More precisely, let S be a space of possible states, F be some algebra equipped on S,
andmembers ofF are referred to as events. An event E is said to occur if s ∈ E, where s
is the true state of the world. Let {E1, . . . , En} be a finite partition of Swhere each Ei ∈
F . Further, let µ(Ei) represent the decision maker’s degree of belief in the occurrence
of Ei. In de Finetti’s theory, an agent’s degree of belief (subjective probability) µ(Ei) is
assumed to guide their decisions in betting situations in the following way. µ(Ei) is
the rate at which the agent (the bettor) is willing to bet on whether Ei will occur. The
bet is so structured that it will cost the bettor ciµ(Ei) with the prospect of gaining ci if
event Ei transpires. The ci’s are, however, decided by the bettor’s opponent (the bookie)
and can be either positive or negative (a negative gain means that the bettor has to pay
the absolute amount |ci| to the bookie).
The bettor is said to be coherent if there is no selection of {ci}ni=1 by the bookie such
that sups∈S ∑
n
i=1 ci
[
χEi(s)− µ(Ei)
]
< 0, where χEi is the characteristic function of Ei.
In other words, the agent’s degrees of beliefs in {Ei}ni=1 are coherent if no sequence
of bets can be arranged by the bookie such that they constantly yield a negative total
return for the bettor regardless which state of the world transpires. Guided by this
coherence principle, de Finetti showed that there exists at least one measure µ defined
on F such that, for any selection of payoffs {ci}ni=1, sups∈S ∑ni=1 ci
[
χEi(s)− µ(Ei)
] ≥ 0.
In addition, it was shown by de Finetti (1930) that µ can be extended to any algebra
of events that contains F . In particular, µ can be extended to P(S) – so condition (i)
can be satisfied; and that µ is a FA probability measure – that is, µ satisfies (ii) and
(iii*). These mathematical results developed by de Finetti in the 1920-30s played an
important role in shaping his view on the issue of additivity.5
Savage enlists the early works of de Finetti’s, as well as a similar result proved
by Banach (1932), as part of his mathematical reasons not to impose CA. “It is a little
better,” he says, “not to assume countable additivity as a postulate.” Let us group
these main mathematical arguments as follows.
(†) There does not exist a CA uniform distribution over the integers, whereas in the
case of FA such a distribution does exist.
(‡) There does not exist, according to Savage, a CA extension of the Lebesgue measure
to all subsets of the reals, whereas in the case of FA such an extension does exist.
I shall address (†) in the rest of this section, (‡) the next.
5. The first chapter of de Finetti (1937b, English translation as de Finetti (1937a)) contains a
nontechnical summary of de Finetti (1930, 1931, in Italian) on “the logic of the probable” where the
aforementioned mathematical results were given. See Regazzini (2013) for a more detailed account
of de Finetti’s critique of CA.
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2.1. Open-mindedness and symmetry
Appendix A includes an example of a probability measure defined for all subsets of
the natural numbers which exhibits the following main properties advocated by de
Finetti: (a) it is FA but not CA; (b) it assigns measure 0 to all singletons; and (c) it is
uniformly distributed (cf. Example A.1). Opinions, however, differ widely as to why
each of these properties constitutes a rational constraint on the notion of subjective
probability, especially in view of the operationalist account of probability we owe to
writers like Ramsey, Savage, and, surely, de Finetti himself.6 For our purposes, let us
focus on uniformity.
Presumably, de Finetti’s insistence on the inclusion of uniform distributions was
by and large based on the consideration of open-mindedness – rational agents should
not have prior prejudices over different types of distributions, all distributions should
at least be considered permissible. In addition, the assumption of uniformity is often
justified on the ground of certain symmetry considerations, that is, in the absence of any
existing choice algorithm, eachmember of a set over which a probability distribution is
defined can be seen as having equal possibilities of being chosen. Hence, the argument
goes, if there is any incompatibility between uniformity and CA, the latter should yield
to the former because of these ‘higher’ considerations.7
Admittedly, as a plea for inclusiveness, it is no doubt quite an attractive idea to be
all-embracing – Savage’s own demand for µ to be definable for all subsets of S is one
such example (more discussion on this below), so is the demand for all distributions
to be considered permissible if not mandatory. This call for openness may resonate
positively at first, yet upon a closer examination it is unclear on what grounds this
claimed liberalism principally constrain rational decision making. To put it plainly,
in making a decision why does anyone have to be subject to the constraints of open-
mindedness and symmetry at all? Advocates who appeal to this line of justification for
the use of uniform distributions in argument (†) hence face the problem of explaining
why a rule for rational action should always respect these ‘higher’ mandates.
In fact, in the same spirit of liberty, if one is not dogmatic about the criteria of open-
mindedness and symmetry – i.e., they are only permissible but not mandatory, to use
the same terminologies – then it is easy to see that there is ample room for casting
doubts on these principles. Howson and Urbach (1993), for instance, challenge the
basis on which a decision maker randomly chooses an integer and treats the choices
as being equal: “any process [of selecting a number],” they say, “would inevitably be
biased towards the “front end” of the sequence of positive integers.” Indeed, consider,
for instance, 1729 and 277,232,917 − 1, both are famous numbers by now.8 However,
before the latter was discovered, it would take a considerable stretch of imagination to
6. Williamson (1999), for instance, provides a generalised Dutch book argument – an equivalent
of the aforementioned coherence principle – for the countable case which naturally leads to CA in a
de Finetti-style betting system. Bartha (2004) questions the requirement of assigning measure 0 to all
singletons and develops an alternative interpretation for which such a requirement is relaxed.
7. Thanks to a referee for highlighting this objection.
8. 277,232,917 − 1 was the largest known prime number when this paper was produced, which
was discovered in 2017.
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envisage a situation where the two numbers are treated as equal citizens of the number
kingdom: for one thing, the second is a number with 23, 249, 425 digits, it would take
about 6,685 pages of A4 paper to print it fully out. It is not difficulty to imagine that,
before its discovery, this number hardly appeared anywhere on the surface of planet
earth, let alone being considered as equally selectable by some choice procedure.
In practice, it has become a matter of taste, so to speak, for theorists to either en-
dorse or reject one or both of these principles, based on their intuitions as well as on
what technical details their models require. In fact, Savage is among those who contest
the assumption of uniformity. He says:
[I]f, for example (following de Finetti [D2]), a new postulate asserting
that S can be partitioned into an arbitrarily large number of equivalent
subsets were assumed, it is pretty clear (and de Finetti explicitly shows
in [D2]) that numerical probabilities could be so assigned. It might fairly
be objected that such a postulate would be flagrantly ad hoc. On the other
hand, such a postulate could be made relatively acceptable by observing
that it will obtain if, for example, in all the world there is a coin that
the person is firmly convinced is fair, that is, a coin such that any finite
sequence of heads and tails is or him no more probably than any other
sequence of the same length; though such coin is, to be sure, a considerable
idealization. (p. 33, emphases added. [D2] refers to de Finetti (1937b).)
As seen, for Savage, only a thin line separates the assumption of uniformity from
a spell of good faith. There is yet another and more technical reason why he refrains
from making this assumption as it is alluded to in the quote above. This will take a
little unpacking.
In deriving probability measures, both de Finetti and Savage invoke a notion of
qualitative probability, which is a binary relation ⪰ defined over events: For events E, F,
E ⪰ F says that ‘E is weakly more probable than F’ (or ‘E is no less probable than F’).
E and F are said to be equally probable, written E ≡ F, if both E ⪰ F and F ⪰ E. A
qualitative probability satisfies a set of intuitive properties.9 The goal is to impose some
additional assumption(s) on ⪰ so that it can be represented by a unique quantitative
probability, µ, that is, E ⪰ F if and only if µ(E) ≥ µ(F).
The approach adopted by de Finetti (1937b) and Koopman (1940a,b, 1941) was to
assume that any event can be partitioned into arbitrarily small and equally probable
sub-events – i.e., the assumption of uniform partitions (UP):
UP For any event A and any n < ∞, A can be partitioned into n many equally prob-
able sub-events, i.e. there is a partition {B1, . . . , Bn} of A such that Bi ≡ Bj.
9. Formally, a binary relation ⪰ over an algebra of events F is said to be a qualitative probability
if the following hold for all A, B,C ∈ F : (1) ⪰ is a total preorder; (2) A ⪰ ∅; (3) S ≻ ∅; and (4) if
A ∩ C = B ∩ C = ∅ then A ⪰ B ⇐⇒ A ∪ C ⪰ B ∪ C.
Historically, it was thought that, at least for the finite cases, these four conditions are sufficient
in arriving at numeric representations. A counterexample, however, was quickly found by Kraft
et al. (1959) who gave an example of a qualitative probability defined over the Boolean algebra of all
subsets of a set consisting of only five members, for which there is no numeric representation.
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As noted by Savage, when added to the list of properties of qualitative probabilities,
UP is deductively sufficient in delivering a numeric representation (UP is a simple
version of the Archimedean condition normally required in a representation theorem).
Thus, it is out of both the intuitive appeal to symmetry andmathematical necessity that
de Finetti comes to endorse UP.
Savage, however, is not tied to either of these two considerations. Given his view
on uniform distributions – they are being “flagrantly ad hoc” – Savage needs to find an
alternative way of arriving at a representation theorem without invoking UP. To this
end, he introduces a concept of almost uniform partition (AUP):
AUP For any event A and any n < ∞, A can be partitioned into n many sub-events
such that the union of any r < n sub-events of the partition is no more probable
than that of any r+ 1 sub-events.
The idea is to partition an event into arbitrarily “fine” sub-events but without asking
them to be equally probable. It is plain that a uniform partition is an almost uniform
partition, but not vice versa.
The genius of Savage’s proof was thus to show (1) that his proposed axioms are
sufficient in defining AUP in his system and (2) that AUP is all that is needed in order
to arrive at a numeric representation of qualitative probability. Technical details of how
numeric probability measures are derived in Savage’s theory do not concern us here.10
But what is clear is that, in view of Savage’s take on uniformity it would be misplaced
to invoke argument (†) against CA within his system.
2.2. Money pump and infinite bets
Even if we grant that uniformly distributed measures be permissible in Savage-type
decision models, it can be shown that the admission of such a measure together with
FA may subject an agent to a Dutch book. Appendix B contains an example of Adams’
money pump, where the agent’s subjective probability is FA but not CA and is defined
in terms of the uniform distribution λ introduced in Example A.1. As shown there, a
series of bets can be arranged such that the bettor suffers a sure loss.
Adams’ money pump is surprising, because it results in a set of incoherent choices
made by the bettor, a result that is precisely what subjectivist systems like Savage’s are
devised to avoid. Indeed, if there is a single principle that unites early Bayesian subject-
ivists it would arguably be coherence. One import reason this principle is fundamental
to Bayesian subjectivism is that this coherence-oriented approach to rationality demo-
cratises, so to speak, legitimate reasons for acting: different agents might be moved by
different (probabilistic or utility) considerations that lead them to behave differently
(or similarly), but as long as their behaviours are consistent, they are equally rational
in the subjectivist sense. For instance, when both picking up a slice of cheesecake, I
doubt my five-year old nephew had to endure the same kind of inner struggles that I
had to deal with – he, for one thing, certainly would not think of going for the second
10. For an outline see Gaifman and Liu (2018, §3).
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largest slice for a quite nuanced reason. But as long as we both are consistent in our
choices we are equally rational in the eyes of subjectivists. For subjectivists, the notion
of rationality is based on a rather weak logical principle, namely coherence.11 Adams’
example reveals a conflict with this basic principle.
When faced with this difficulty, advocates of FA often argue that given that a
subjective decision theory is a systematisation of coherent decision made by rational
agents it is unclear what it means for a bettor to fulfil the task of coherently betting
infinitely many times. On this view, the challenge from Adams’ money pump, which
requires the bettor to accept infinitely many gambles, is a non-starter, for it envisages
a situation that is not operationally feasible.12
Perhaps, this is another place where a theorist needs to exercise their acquired taste
in order to discern whether or not it is conceptually salient to entertain infinite bets. I,
nonetheless, want to point out that there is already a great deal of idealisation built into
the the subjectivist theory that requires us to be somewhat imaginative. As a starter, it
is a common practice to assume that the agents being modelled are logically omniscient.
One reason for upholding such an assumption is that, in a model of decision making
under uncertainties, uncertainties may stem from different sources: they may be due
to the lack of empirical knowledge or the result of computational failures. To separate
different types of uncertainties, it is often assumed, like in de Finetti’s and Savage’s
systems, that the agents are equipped with unlimited deductive capacities in logic.
However, let’s face it, it would be quite a double standard to insist in these systems
that agents are infinitely capable when it comes to computational or inferential per-
formances, on the one hand; but to appeal to certain physical or psychological realism
when it comes to accepting bets, on the other. This, nevertheless, does not mean that
there can be no limits to the amount of idealisations that one injects into a model. In
what follows we will explore some measures for constraining idealism that may lead
to a better understanding of theoretic modelling.
3. Higher Mathematics and Conceptual Realism
Let us return to argument (‡). Savage (1972, p. 41) cites the well-known result of Ulam
(1930) in asserting that any atomless σ-additive extension of Lebesgue measure to all
subsets of the unit interval is incompatible with the continuum hypothesis (CH), from
which he concludes that there is no extension that satisfies all of (i)-(iii). However, it is
unclear why this constitutes a sufficient reason for relaxing CA.13
11. This, of course, does not mean that my rational decisions – rational in the subjectivist sense
– are always wise ones. I might get totally soaked in the rain due to some bad, albeit coherent,
estimations I made earlier. But in hearing my complaints, the subjectivist would simply shrug and
point out that they never promised to keep my pants dry.
12. Thanks to Isaac Levi for pointing out this line of objection to me, which echoes de Finetti’s
view that a rational agent is not obliged to accept more than finitely many fair bets at a given time.
13. Ulam (1930) proved that, for any uncountable set S with |S| = κ, it can be shown in ZFC
that if κ is a successor (and hence a regular) cardinal (e.g., κ = ℵ1), then there does not exist a
measure on S satisfying all of (i)-(iii). It follows that if there is a σ-additive non-trivial extension of
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Table 3.1: Consistent extensions of Lebesgue measure to P(R) under different set-
theoretic assumptions
Axioms Savage Solovay
FA ✓
CA ✓
AC ✓
DC ✓
CH ✓
I ✓
P(R) ✓ ✓
As a matter of fact, in his article entitled “A model of set theory in which every set
of reals is Lebesgue measurable” Solovay (1970) showed that such a σ-additive exten-
sion of Lebesgue measure to all sets of reals does exist if the existence of an inaccessible
cardinal (I) and a weaker version of AC – i.e. the principle of dependent choice (DC) –
are assumed.14 Thus, it seems that insofar as the possibility of obtaining a σ-additive
extension of Lebesgue measure to all subsets of the reals is concerned, Savage’s set-
theoretic argument – which calls for exclusion of CA – is inconclusive. For the existence
of such an extension really depends on the background set theory: it does not exist in
ZFC+CH, but does exist in ZF+DC (assuming ZFC+I is consistent). (cf. Table 3.1 for a
side-by-side comparison.)
3.1. Logical omniscience and measurability
As seen, Savage’s set-theoretic argument for not imposing CA was given in ZFC+CH,
where it is known that, in the uncountable case, there is no non-trivial measure sim-
ultaneously satisfies conditions (i)–(iii) above; and that Savage’s immediate reaction
Lebesgue measure on 2ℵ0 then CHmust fail. (It is worth mentioning that, prior to Ulam, Banach and
Kuratowski (1929) showed that if there is a measure on 2ℵ0 then 2ℵ0 > ℵ1.) Yet, even without the
concern for CH, there is an aspect of Ulam’s original results that was not addressed by Savage: it was
shown by Ulam (1930) that, in ZFC, if there is a σ-additive non-trivial measure µ on any uncountable
set S with |S| = κ then µ is a measure on κ such that
1. either κ is a measurable cardinal (and hence an inaccessible cardinal), on which a nontrivial
σ-additive two-valued measure can be defined;
2. or κ is a real-valued measurable cardinal (and hence a weakly inaccessible cardinal) such that
κ ≤ 2ℵ0 , on which a non-trivial σ-additive atomless measure can be defined.
In the second case, it is plain that µ can be extended to a measure on 2ℵ0 : for any X ⊆ 2ℵ0 , let
µ(X) = µ(X ∩ κ). This leads to a general method of obtaining a countably additive measure on all
subsets of the reals that extends Lebesgue measure (see Jech, 2003, p. 131).
14. The relative consistency proof by Solovay (1970) showed that if ZFC+I has a model then
ZF+DC has a model in which every set of reals is Lebesgue measurable (see also Jech, 2003, p. 50).
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was to replace the third, i.e., the CA condition, with FA.15 The particular set-theoretic
argument Savage relied on – namely the existence of Ulam matrix which leads to the
non-existence of a measure over ℵ1 (cf. Footnote 13) – uses AC in an essential way.
One unavoidable consequence of this approach is that it introduces non-measurable
sets in ZFC. Now, if one insists on imposing condition (i) for defining subjective prob-
ability – that is, a subjective probability measure be defined for all subsets of the states
– this amounts to introducing non-measurable sets into Savage’s decision model. Yet,
it is unclear what one may gain from making such a high demand.
Non-measurable sets are meaningful only insofar as we have a good understand-
ing of the contexts in which they apply. These sets are highly interesting within certain
branches of mathematics largely because the introduction of these sets reveals in a
deep way the complex structures of the underlying mathematical systems. However,
this does not mean that these peculiar set-theoretic constructs should be carried over
to a system that is primarily devised to model rational decision making.
It might be objected that the subjectivist theory we are concerned with is, after all,
highly idealised – the assumption of logical omniscience, for instance, is adopted in
almost all classical decision models. By that extension, one may as well assume that
the agent being modelled is mathematically omniscient (an idealised perfect mathem-
atician). Then, it should be within the purview of this super agent to contemplate non-
measurable sets/events in decision situations. Besides, if we exclude non-measurable
sets from decision theory, then why stop there? In other words, precisely where shall
we draw the line between what can and cannot be idealised in such models?
This is a welcome point, for it highlights the issue of how much idealism one can
instil into a theoretic model. It is no secrete that decision theorists are constantly torn
between the desire to aspire to the perfect rationality prescribed in the classical theor-
ies, on the one hand; and the need for a more realistic approach to practical rationality,
on the other. Admittedly, this “line” between idealism and realism is sometimes a
moving target – it often depends on the goal of modelling and, well, the fine taste of
the theorist. An appropriate amount of idealism allows us to simplify the configura-
tion of some aspects of a theoretic model so that we can focus on some other aspects
of interests. An overdose, however, might be counter-effective as it may introduce
unnecessary mysteries into the underlying system.
Elsewhere (Gaifman and Liu, 2018), we introduced a concept of conceptual real-
ism in an attempt to start setting up some boundaries between idealism and realism
in decision theory. We argued that, as a minimum requirement, the idealisations one
entertains in a theoretic model should be justifiable within the confine of one’s conceiv-
15. Savage was not alone in taking this line. Seidenfeld (2001), for instance, enlisted the non-
existence of a non-trivial σ-additive measure defined over the power set of an uncountable set as the
first of his six reasons for considering a theory of probability that is based on FA. It is interesting to
note that Seidenfeld also referred to the result of Solovay, however no further discussion on the signi-
ficant of this result on CA versus FA was given (see Seidenfeld, 2001, p. 168). See Bingham (2010, §9)
for a discussion and responses to each of Seidenfeld’s six reasons. The set-theoretic argument presen-
ted here, in response to Seidenfeld’s first, i.e., the measurability reason is different from Bingham’s
“approximation” argument.
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ability. And, importantly, what is taken to be conceivable should be anchored from the
theorist’s point of view, instead of delegating it to some imaginary super agent. Let
me elaborate with the example at hand.
As noted above, it is a common practice to adopt the assumption of logical om-
niscience in Bayesian models. This step of idealisation is not, I stress, a blind leap of
faith. Rather, it is grounded in our understanding of the basic logical and computa-
tional apparatuses involved. We, as actual reasoners, acknowledge that our inferential
performances are bounded by various physical and psychological limitations. Yet a
good grasp of the underlying logical machinery gives rise to the conceivable picture as
to what it means for a logically omniscient agent to fulfil, at least in principle, the task
of, say, drawing all the logical consequences from a given proposition.16
This justificatory picture – which apparently is based on certain inductive reason-
ing – becomes increasingly blurry when we start contemplating how our super agent
comes to entertain non-measurable events in the context of rational decision making.
The Banach–Tarski paradox sets just the example of how much we lack geometric and
physical intuitions when it comes to non-measurable sets. This means, unlike logical
omniscience, we don’t have any clue of what we are asking from our super agent:
beyond any specific set-theoretic context there is just no good intuitive basis for con-
ceiving non-measurable sets. Yes, it might be comforting that we can shift the burden
of conceiving the inconceivables to an imaginary supper agent, but in the end such a
delegated job is either meaningless or purely fictional. So it seems that if there is any
set-theoretic oddity to be avoided here it should be non-measurable sets.17
On this matter, I should add that Savage himself is fully aware that the set-theoretic
context in which his decision model is developed exceeds what one can expect from
a rational decision maker (Savage, 1967). He also cites the Banach–Tarski paradox
as an example to show the extent to which highly abstract set theory can contradict
common sense intuitions. However, it seems that Savage’s readiness to embrace all-
inclusiveness of defining the background algebra as “all sets of states” overwhelms
his willingness to avoid this set-theoretic oddity.
16. With this being said, I should however point out that the demand to have a deductively
closed system remains as a challenge to any normative theory of beliefs. In his essay titled “diffi-
culties in the theory of personal probability,” Savage (1967, p. 308) remarked that the postulates of
his theory imply that agents should behave in accordance with the logical implications of all that
they know, which can be very costly. In other words, conducting logical deductions is an extremely
resource consuming activity – the merits it brings can sometimes be offset by its high costs. Hence
some might say that the assumption of logical omniscience – a promise of being able to discharge
unlimited deductive resources – may at best be seen as an unfeasible idealisation. This is not the
place to open a new line of discussion on the legitimacy of logical omniscience. The point I am trying
to make is rather that, unlike non-measurable sets, being logically all powerful, however unfeasible,
is not something that is conceptually inconceivable.
17. In an unpublished work, Haim Gaifman made a similar point against the often cited analogy
between finitely additive probabilities in countable partitions and countably additive probabilities
in uncountable partitions in the literature (see, e.g., Schervish and Seidenfeld, 1986) that such an
analogy plays a major heuristic role in set theory but provides no useful guideline in the case of
subjective probabilities for the reason that certain mathematical structures required to make salient
this analogy has no meaning in a personal decision theory, and hence the analogy essentially fails.
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3.2. The standard approach
In fact, the situation can be largely simplified if we choose to work, instead of with all
subsets of the state space S, but with a sufficiently rich collection of subsets of S (for
instance, the Borel setsB in the case where S = R) where, as a well established theory,
CA is in perfectly good health. That is, instead of (i), we require that
(i*) µ is defined on (Lebesgue) measurable sets of R.
Note that the price of forfeiting the demand from condition (i) is a rather small one
to pay. It amounts to disregarding all those events that are defined by Lebesgue non-
measurable sets. Indeed, even Savage himself conceded that
All that has been, or is to be, formally deduced in this book concerning
preferences among sets, could be modified, mutatis mutandis, so that the
class of events would not be the class of all subsets of S, but rather a
Borel field, that is, a σ-algebra, on S; the set of all consequences would
be measurable space, that is, a set with a particular σ-algebra singled out;
and an act would be a measurable function from the measurable space of
events to the measurable space of consequences. (Savage, 1972, p. 42)
It shall be emphasised that this modification of the definition of events from, say, the
set of all subsets of (0, 1] to the Borel set B of (0, 1] is not carried out at the expense
of dismissing a large collection of events that are otherwise representable. As noted
by Billingsley (2012, p. 23), “[i]n fact, B contains all the subsets of (0, 1] actually en-
countered in ordinary analysis and probability. It is large enough for all ‘practical’
purposes.” By “practical purposes” I take it to mean that all events and measurable
functions considered in economic theories in particular are definable using only meas-
urable sets, and, consequently, there is no need to appeal to non-measurable sets.
To summarise, I have shown that Savage’s mathematical argument against CA is
inconclusive – its validity depends on the background set-theoretic setups and that
CA can in fact form a consistent theory under appropriate arrangements. This brought
us to a fine point concerning how one understands background mathematical details
and how best incorporate idealism into a theoretic model. As we have seen, a healthy
amount of conceptual realism may keep us from many highly idealised fantasies.
4. Countably Additive Probability Measure
In this section I will discuss how CA can be introduced into Savage’s theory and its
relation to other postulates in the system. I will also point out an interesting line for
future research. The discussion in this section will assume the standard approach from
§3.2. Readers who are not interested in this technical part of Savage’s theorymay safely
‘jump to the conclusion’ in the last section.
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4.1. Quantitative and qualitative continuities
In Savage’s representation theorem, it is assumed that the background algebra is a
σ-algebra (i.e., closed under infinite unions and intersections). Savage remarks that
It may seempeculiar to insist on σ-algebras as opposed to finitely additive
algebras even in a context where finitely additive measures are the central
objects, but countable union do seem to be essential to some theorems of
§3 . . . (Savage, 1972, p. 43)
This “peculiar” feature of the system reveals a certain ‘imbalance’ between the finite
adding speed, so to speak, of FA, on the one hand; and countable unions in a σ-algebra,
on the other. There are two intuitive ways to restore the balance. One is to reduce
the size of the background algebra. This is the approach adopted in Gaifman and
Liu (2018), where we invented a new technique of “tri–partition trees” and used it to
prove a representation theorem in Savage’s system without requiring the background
algebra to be a σ-algebra.
The other option is to tune up the adding speed and bring “continuity” between
probability measures and algebraic operations. To be more precise, let (S,F , µ) be a
measure space, µ is said to be continuous from below, if, for any sequence of events
{An}∞n=1 and event A in F , An ↑ A implies that µ(An) ↑ µ(A); it is continuous from
above if An ↓ A implies µ(An) ↓ µ(A), and it is continuous if it is continuous from both
above and below.18 It can be shown that continuity fails in general, if µ is merely FA.19
In fact, it can be proved that continuity holds if and only if µ is CA.
One way to introduce continuity to Savage’s system is to impose a stronger con-
dition on qualitative probability. Let ⪰ be a qualitative probability, defined on a σ-
algebra F of the state space S. Following Villegas (1964), ⪰ is said to be monotonely
continuous if, given any sequence of events An ↑ A (An ↓ A) and any event B,
An ⪯ B (An ⪰ B) for all n =⇒ A ⪯ B (A ⪰ B). (4.1)
Moreover, Villegas showed that if a qualitative probability ⪰ is atomless and mono-
tonously continuous then the numerical probability µ that agrees with ⪰ is unique
and CA.20 Since the qualitative probability in Savage’s system are non-atomic, it is
sufficient to introduce the the property of monotone continuity in order to bring in CA.
We thus can add the following postulate, P8, to Savage’s P1-P7 (in Appendix C), which
is a reformulation of (4.1) in terms of preferences among Savage acts.
18. As notational conventions, An ↑ A means that A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ · · · and ⋃i Ai = A, and µ(An) ↑
µ(A) means that µ(A1) ≤ µ(A2) ≤ · · · and µ(An) → µ(A) as n→ ∞. Similarly, for the other case.
19. As an illustration, it is interesting to note that the strictly FA measure λ in Appendix A is
neither continuous from above nor from below.
20. Villegas (1964) showed that monotone continuity is a necessary and sufficient condition for
the agreeing numerical measure to be CA. It was further shown that any qualitative probability
defined on a finite algebra can be extended to a qualitative probability on a σ-algebra satisfying
monotone continuity, fineness, tightness. Thanks to Savage’s P6, the qualitative probabilities derived
in the system are atomless, fine, and tight, hence CA obtains if the monotone continuity is in place.
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P8 For any a, b ∈ X and for any event B and any sequence of events {An},
(i) if An ↑ A and ca|An + cb|An ≼ ca|B+ cb|B for all n then ca|A+ cb|A ≼ ca|B+ cb|B;
(ii) if An ↓ A and ca|An + cb|An ≽ ca|B+ cb|B for all n then ca|A+ cb|A ≽ ca|B+ cb|B.
This allows us to introduce CA into Savage’s decision model as an added postulate.
P8 (and hence CA), however, cannot replace the role played by P7. This is a delicate
matter, we investigate it in the next section.
4.2. Countable additivity and P7
In Savage’s theory, a representation theorem for simple acts (i.e., acts that may poten-
tially lead to only finitely many consequences) can be given under P1-P6. Savage’s P7
plays the sole role of extending utility representations from simple acts to general acts
(i.e., acts that may potentially lead to infinitely many different outcomes)
Savage (1972, p. 78) gave an example which satisfies the first six of his seven pos-
tulates but not the last one. This is intended to show that the seventh postulate (P7)
is independent of other postulates in Savage’s original system. Upon showing the in-
dependence of P7, Savage remarked that “[f]inite, as opposed to countable, additivity
seems to be essential to this example,” and he conjectured that “perhaps, if the theory
were worked out in a countably additive spirit from the start, little or no counterparts
of P7 would be necessary.” This section is aimed at taking a closer look at Savage
remark on the relation between CA and utility extension under various versions of P7.
In a footnote to the remark above Savage adds: “Fishburn (1970, Exercise 21, p. 213)
has suggested an appropriate weakening of P7.” It turned out that this is inaccurate.
To wit, the following is Fishburn’s suggestion (expressed using our notation).
P7b For any event E ∈ F and a ∈ X, if ca ≽E cg(s) for all s ∈ E then ca ≽E g; and if
ca ≼E cg(s) for all s ∈ E then ca ≼E g.
P7b is weaker than P7 in that it compares act g with a constant act instead of another
general act f . Note that Fishburn’s P7b is derived from the following condition A4b
appeared in his discussion on preferential axioms and bounded utilities (§10.4).
A4b Let X be a set of prizes/consequences and ∆(X) be the set of all probability meas-
ure defined on X, then for any P ∈ ∆(X) and any A ⊆ X if P(A) = 1 and, for
all x ∈ A, δx ≽ (≼)δy for some y ∈ X then P ≽ (≼)δy, where δx denotes the
probability that degenerates at x.
A4b, together with other preference axioms discussed in the same section, are used
to illustrate, among other things, the differences between measures that are countably
additive and those are not. It was proved by Fishburn that the expected utility hypothesis
holds under A4b, that is, if ∆(X) contains only CA measure, then
P ≻ Q ⇐⇒ E(u, P) > E(u,Q), for all P,Q ∈ ∆(X). (4.2)
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Fishburn then showed, by way of a counterexample, that the hypothesis fails if
the set of probability measure contains also merely FA ones. Because of its direct relev-
ancy to our discussion on the additivity condition below, we reproduce this example
(Fishburn, 1970, Theorem 10.2) here.
Example 4.1. Let X = N+ with u(x) = x/(1+ x) for all x ∈ X. Let ∆(X) be the set of
all probability measures on the set of all subsets of X and defined u on ∆(X) by
u(P) = E(u, P) + inf
{
P
[
u(x) ≥ 1− ϵ] : 0 < ϵ ≤ 1}. (4.3)
Define ≻ on ∆(X) by P ≻ Q iff u(P) > u(Q). It is easy to show that A4b holds under
this definition. However if one takes P to be the measure in Appendix A, i.e., a finitely
but not countably additivity probability measure, then we have u(λ) = 1 + 1 = 2.
Hence u(λ) ̸= E(u,λ) = 1. This shows the expected utility hypothesis fails under this
example. 
However, as pointed out by Seidenfeld and Schervish (1983, Appendix), Fishburn’s
proof of (4.2) using A4b was given under the assumption that ∆(X) is closed under
countable convex combination (condition S4 in Fishburn, 1970, p. 137), which in fact is
not derivable in Savage’s system. They show through the following example (see Ex-
ample 2.3, p. 404) that the expected hypothesis fails under the weakened P7b (together
with P1-P6) and this is so even when the underlying probability be CA.
Example 4.2. Let S be [0, 1) and X be the set of rational numbers in [0, 1). Let µ be
uniform probability on measurable subsets of S and let all measurable function f from
S to X satisfying V[ f ] = limi→∞ µ
[
f (s) ≥ 1− 2−i] be acts. For any act f , let U[ f ] =∫
S u( f )dλ where u(x) = x is a utility function on X and define
W[ f ] =U[ f ] +V[ f ]
=
∫
S
u( f (s))dµ(s) + lim
i→∞
µ
[
f (s) ≥ 1− 1
2i
]
.
(4.4)
Further, define f ≻ g if W[ f ] > W[g]. It is easy to see that P1-P6 are satisfied. To see
that W satisfies P7b, note that if for any event E and any a ∈ X, ca ≽E cg(s) for all
s ∈ E, then by (4.4), we have 1 > u(a) ≥ u(g(s)) for any s ∈ E. Note that 1 > u(g(s))
implies V[gχE] = 0 where χ is the indicator function. Thus, W[caχE] =
∫
E u(a)dµ ≥∫
E u(g(s))dµ(s) = W[gχE]. The case ca ≼E cg(s) can be similarly shown. 
In other words, contrary to what Savage had thought, P7b is in fact insufficient in
bringing about a full utility representation theorem even in the presence of CA.21 This
shows, a fortiori, that CA alone is insufficient in carrying the utility function derived
from P1-P6 from simple acts to general acts. Seidenfeld and Schervish (1983, Example
2.2) also showed that this remains the case even if the set of probabilities measure is
taken to be closed under countable convex combination.
21. Here I am indebted to Teddy Seidenfeld.
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As seen, Savage’s last postulate which plays the role of extending the utilities from
simple acts to general acts cannot be easily weakened even in the presence of CA. Yet,
on the other hand, it is clear that CA is a stronger condition than FA originally adopted
in Savage’s theory. So, for future work, it might be of interest to find an appropriate
weakening of P7 in a Savage-style system in the presence of CA that is still sufficient in
extending utilities from simple acts to general acts.
5. Conclusion
Two general concerns often underlie the disagreements over FA versus CA in Bayesian
models. First, there is a mathematical consideration as to whether or not the kind of
additivity in use accords well with demanded mathematical details in the background.
Second, there is a philosophical interest in understanding whether or not the type of
additivity in use is conceptually justifiable.
Regarding the first concern, Savage provided a set-theoretic argument against CA
where he argues that CA is not in good conformity with demanded set-theoretic details.
As we have seen, Savage’s argument is misguided due to an overlook of some crucial
technical details: CA can be coherently incorporated in his personal decision theory
without serious set-theoretic complications. As for the second concern, we noted that
both arguments (†) and (‡) – which had been enlisted to bear evidence against CA in
Savage-type decision theory – are inadequate in the context of Savage’s theory of ex-
pected utilities. In dealing with these issues, we took a closer look at the mathematical
details involved, where I argued that in order for a piece of mathematics employed in
defining subjective probability to be meaningful it is necessary that it be handled in a
conceptually realistic manner anchored from the theorist’s point of view.
As far as Savage’s system is concerned, there does not seem to be sufficient reason
why the model cannot be extended to include CA. As a general guide, it might be of
interests to take a more pragmatic line when it comes to adopting FA or CA. Following
this advice, I would return to a point made at the outset that, given how widespread
and useful CA measures are in modern probability theory, it’s better to presuppose CA
and only to weaken it to FA when called for.
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A. Uniform Distribution over the Natural Numbers
Auniformly distributed probabilistic measure on natural numbersN is of particular in-
terest because (1) it serves a good purpose of delineating the difference between finite
additivity and countable additivity; (2) its use is often tied to the notion of random-
ness: it amounts to saying that choose a number “at random.” The latter is commonly
understood in the following relative frequentist interpretation of uniformity of natural
numbers. Let A be any subset of N. For each number n < ∞, denote the number of
elements in A that are less or equal to n by A(n), that is,
A(n) =
∣∣∣A ∩ {1, . . . , n}∣∣∣. (A.1)
Define the density of A by the limit (if exists)
d(A) = lim
n→∞
A(n)
n
. (A.2)
Let Cd be the collection of all sets of natural numbers that have densities. The following
properties of the density function are easy to verify.
1. d(∅) = 0 and d(N) = 1.
2. For each natural number n, d({n}) = 0.
3. For any finite A ∈ Cd, d(A) = 0.
4. If A, B, A ∪ B ∈ Cd and A ∩ B = ∅, then d(A ∪ B) = d(A) + d(B).
5. If A ∈ Cd, then, for any number n, A + n ∈ Cd and d(A) = d(A + n), where
A+ n = {x+ n | x ∈ A}.
6. The set of even numbers has density 1/2, or more generally, the set of numbers
that are divisible by m < ∞ has density 1/m.
Notice that d is not defined for all subsets ofN (Cd is not a field of natural numbers).
We hence seek to extend d to a finitely additive probability measure µ so that µ is
defined for all subsets of the natural numbers and that µ agrees with d on Cd. The
following is an example of such a measure that is often used in the literature.
Example A.1. Let {λn} be a sequence of functions defined onN such that
λn(i) =
{
1/n if 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
0 if i > n.
(A.3)
It can be shown that the λn(i)’s converge to a function λ definable for all subsets ofN
which extends d.22 What is important to us is that λ exhibits following properties:
22. See Rao and Rao (1983, Theorem 3.2.10). Hrbacek and Jech (1999, Ch. 11) contains a set-
theoretic construction.
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1. λ is defined for all subsets ofN.
2. λ(∅) = 0 and λ(N) = 1.
3. λ is finitely additive.
4. λ is not countably additive.
5. For any i < ∞, λ
({i}) = 0.
6. For any A ⊆ N, if A is finite then λ(A) = 0; if A is cofinite (i.e., if N− A if
finite) then λ(A) = 1.
7. λ({2n | n ∈N}) = 1/2, i.e., the set of even numbers has measure 1/2.
8. In general, the set of numbers that are divisible by m < ∞ has measure 1/m,
that is, λ({1m, 2m, 3m, . . .}) = 1/m. As a result of this property, we have that
the assignment of µ can be arbitrarily small: for any λ > 0, there exists some n
such that the set of numbers that are divisible by n has measure 1/n < ϵ. 
B. Adams’ Money Pump
Adams (1962) showed that there are scenarios in which the failure of countably ad-
ditivity leads to a money pump. More precisely, Adams’ example presents a betting
situation where a (Bayes) rational gambler is justified in accepting, with a small fee,
each bet of a sequences of bets, but the acceptance of all the bets leads to sure loss. For
completion, I include a variant of this example here.
Example B.1. Let S = N, X = [−1, 1], and let the identity function u(x) = x be
the utility function on X. Let λ be the finitely but not countably additive measure on
positive integers given in Example A.1 and let η be the countably additive probability
measure on S defined by
η(n) =
1
2n
for all n ∈ S.
Define subjective probability µ to be such that
µ(n) =
λ(n) + η(n)
2
for all n ∈ S. (B.1)
The following is a list of simple properties of µ.
1. µ is a finitely but not countably additive probability measure.
2. For any n < ∞,
µ(n) =
0+ η(n)
2
=
1
2n+1
.
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Table B.1: Gamble gn
Bn = {n} S− Bn
gn 1/2n+1 − r 1/2n+1
3. µ(S) = 1, whereas
∞
∑
i=1
µ(i) = ∑
∞
i=1 λ(i) +∑
∞
i=1 η(i)
2
=
0+ 1
2
=
1
2
.
4. For any finite E ⊆ S,
µ(E) =
0+ η(E)
2
= ∑
i∈E
1
2i+1
.
Now, for each n, consider gamble gn with payoff described as in Table B.1. That
is to say, gn pays 1/
(
2n+1
)
no matter which state obtains, but will cost the gambler
r ∈ ( 12 , 1) in the event of Bn = {n}. Since r < 1, it is easy to calculate that, for each n,
gn has a positive expected return:
U[gn] =
1
2n+1
·
( 1
2n+1
− r
)
+
(
1− 1
2n+1
)
· 1
2n+1
=
1
2n+1
· (1− r).
Hence, a (Bayes) rational gambler should be willing to pay a small fee (< U[gn]) to ac-
cept each gamble. However, the acceptance of all gambles leads to sure loss no matter
which number eventually transpires. To see this, note that, for any given number m,
gamble gn pays
gn(m) =
1
2n+1
− r · χBn(m)
But, the joint of all gn’s yields
∑
i∈S
gi(m) = ∑
i∈S
[ 1
2i+1
− r · χBi(m)
]
=
1
2
− r < 0.
That is to say, for each possible outcome m ∈ S, the expected value of getting m from
accepting all the gambles gn’s is negative. 
C. Savage’s Postulates
Let S be the set of states of the world and X the set of consequences. F is a σ-algebra
equipped on S. A Savage act f is a function mapping from S to X. An act is said
to be constant with respect to consequence a ∈ X, denote by ca, if ca(s) for all s ∈ S.
Define the combination of acts f and gwith respect to an event E (a set of states), written
f |E+ g|E, to be such that:
( f |E+ g|E)(s) =Df
{
f (s) if s ∈ E
g(s) if s ∈ E,
where E = S− E = the complement of E.
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Definition (conditional preference). Let E be some event, then, given acts f , g ∈ A,
f is said to be weakly preferred to g given E, written f ≽E g, if, for all pairs of acts
f ′, g′ ∈ A,
1. f agrees with f ′ and g agrees with g′ on E, and
2. f ′ agrees with g′ on E
imply
f ′ ≽ g′.
That is, f ≽E g if, for all f ′, g′ ∈ A,
f (s) = f ′(s), g(s) = g′(s) if s ∈ E
f ′(s) = g′(s) if s ∈ E.
}
=⇒ f ′ ≽ g′. (C.1)
Definition (Null events). An event E is said to be a null if, for any acts f , g ∈ A,
f ≽E g. (C.2)
That is, an event is null if the agent is indifferent between any two acts given E.
Intuitively speaking, null events are those events such that, according to the agent’s
believes, the possibility that they occur can be ignored.
Savage’s Postulates
P1 ≽ is a weak order (complete preorder).
P2 For any f , g ∈ A and for any E ∈ B, f ≽E g or g ≽E f .
P3 For any a, b ∈ X and for any non-null event E ∈ B, ca ≽E cb if and only if a ≥ b.
P4 For any a, b, c, d ∈ C satisfying a ≽ b and c ≽ d and for any events E, F ∈ B,
ca|E+ cb|E ≽ ca|F+ cb|F if and only if cc|E+ cd|E ≽ cc|F+ cd|F.
P5 For some constant acts ca, cb ∈ A, cb ≻ ca.
P6 For any f , g ∈ A and for any a ∈ C, if f ≻ g then there is a finite partition {Pi}ni=1
such that, for all i, ca|Pi + f |Pi ≻ g and f ≻ ca|Pi + g|Pi.
P7 For any event E ∈ B, if f ≽E cg(s) for all s ∈ E then f ≽E g.
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